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Notes
REMEDIES OF THE SELLER IN A CONDITIONAL SALE
OF CHATTELS
Almost all modern installment payment plans depend on the
use of either the conditional sale or an absolute sale with an im-
mediate giving back of a chattel mortgage.1 "The retention of
title by the seller, notwithstanding possession, use, and apparent
ownership by the buyer, is the characteristic feature of a condi-
tional sale . . . The passage of property in the goods to the
buyer is always subject to the performance of some condition
precedent. ' 2 The chattel mortgage proceeds upon an entirely
different theory, although it may lead to much the same results
through the incorporation of special clauses. In the latter form
title passes absolutely to the buyer at once and the seller is given
back a mere lien on the goods.3 Despite the view of some recent
writers4 that the conditional sale is essentially a chattel mort-
gage, it is still in the absence of special statutes vitally important
1 For a laudatory account of installment selling, cf. Seligman, THE
ECONOMICS OF INSTALLMENT SELLING (1927).
2 Bogert, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924) 5. The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act says, "In this Act 'Conditional Sale' means (1) any
contract for the sale of goods under which possession is delivered to the
buyer and the property in the goods is to vest in the buyer at a subsequent
time upon the payment of a part or all of the price, or upon the perform-
ance of any other condition or the happening of any contingency; or (2)
any contract for bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee
contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially equal to the value of
the goods and by which it is agreed the bailee or lessee is bound to become or
has the option of becoming the owner of such goods upon full compliance
with the terms of the contract." Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 1.
The Uniform Act has been adopted in eight jurisdictions. Alaska Laws
1919 c. 13; Ariz. Laws 1919 c. 40; Del. Laws 1919 c. 192; N. J. Laws 1919 c.
210; N. Y. Laws 1922 c. 642; Pa. Laws 1925 no. 325; S. D. Laws 1919 c. 137;
W. Va. Laws 1925 c. 64; Wis. Laws 1919 c. 672.
3 5 R. C. L. 383-384.
4 1 Williston, ON SALES (2nd ed. 1924) 771; Vold, ON SALES (1931) 289-
295.
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to distinguish between the two in considering what the remedies
of the parties are and ought to be.5 Unfortunately it is not al-
ways easy to determine whether a given contract is actually a
conditional sale or something else. Clever lawyers frequently
attempt to disguise a conditional sale in some other garb, often
that of a lease so as to obtain greater rights for their clients,
who are really vendors. 6 As was pointed out by the Missouri
Court of Appeals in a recent case, the nature of the contract is
not determined by "its technical form, but from the intention
of the parties as gathered from the four corners of the con-
tract . . . A test usually applied in determining whether a
particular instrument is a lease or a conditional sales contract
is whether or not such instrument requires or permits the trans-
feree to return the property in lieu of paying the purchase price.
If the return of the property is either required or permitted such
an instrument will be held to be a lease. On the other hand, if
the transferee is obligated to pay the purchase price, even
though such price is denominated rental or hire, the contract will
be held one of sale." 7
In so far as the conditional vendor's rights are based on his
title to the goods sold, it would seem just and reasonable at first
glance that they be the same whether asserted against the vendee
or someone claiming under the latter. This was the original
view, but experience showed that secret conditional sales con-
tract would sometimes suddenly come to light and deprive an in-
nocent purchaser of goods for which he had paid full value.8 To
remedy this evil almost all the states have passed statutes re-
quiring conditional sales contracts to be recorded under penalty
of making them void as against certain classes of persons other
than the original vendee. 9 The Missouri Statute dates back to
1877, providing that the condition precedent in the contract
"shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers in good faith, and
5 Not only because of the important theoretical difference, which would
cause a different theoretical approach to the cases even if the results would
finally grant the parties the same rights, but also because of certain prac-
tical differences that cannot be overcome no matter in what form a chattel
mortgage is written, e. g., a trustee in bankruptcy has a right to the goods
as against a chattel mortgagee but has no right to them as against a con-
ditional vendor after a default. In re Seward Dredging Co. (C. C. A. 2,
1917) 242 F. 225, certiorari denied (1917) 245 U. S. 651.
6 Cf. notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 147, (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1252.
7Kolb v. Golden Rule Baking Co. (1928) 222 Mo. App. 1068, 9 S. W. (2d)
840.8 urmser v. Stivey (1893) 52 Mo. App. 424.
9 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 5 and cf. collection of statutes from
all states which have not adopted the Uniform Act in an appendix to the
Act as printed in volume 2 of the Uniform Laws Annotated series.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss2/10
NOTES
creditors unless such condition shall be evidenced by writing
executed, acknowledged and recorded as provided in the case of
mortgages of personal property." 0 The Statute relating to the
recording of chattel mortgages requires them to be recorded in
the office of the recorder of deeds of the county wherein the
property was at the time of making the mortgage." The Statute
requires that the purchaser buy in good faith, i. e., without no-
tice, to be able to avail himself of its protective mantle, 12 but it is
not as clear as it might be whether or not the same condition ap-
plies to a creditor who has seized the property by attachment or
levied upon it. The Missouri Supreme Court first took the view
that the two classes were to be treated alike,' 3 but this case was
expressly overruled in 1892 and it has become settled that a
creditor is protected even though at the time he made the attach-
ment or levy he knew all the facts of the conditional sales trans-
action.14 This decision is probably sounder as a matter of
grammatical interpretation, but it would seem to give the cred-
itor an unfair advantage, particularly if he made the loan after
the conditional sales contract was made. To be safe the vendor
should always record all such contracts at once, paying the small
fees involved as a matter of insurance. As a realistic criticism
of the policy of the Statute it may be suggested that the average
purchaser or creditor would never bother to go to the office of
the recorder of deeds and search the voluminous archives to dis-
cover if there was such a contract. The Statute was enacted
when the installment buying scheme was largely applied to the
sales of machinery and the like, rather than to articles for use
by individuals, and was probably a real protection under those
conditions, for a capitalist buying a plant should and normally
does make a thorough investigation.
The simplest thing for the seller to do on default in the pay-
10 Mo. Laws 1877 p. 320, now R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3125. There is also
a special law as to conditional sales of railroad equipment. R. S. Mo.
(1929) secs. 4906-4909.
11 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3097.
12 American Clay Machinery Co. v. Sedalia Brick and Tile Co. (1913) 174
Mo. App. 485, 160 S. W. 902. Where the goods have been sold to a dealer
who resells them to a purchaser in ordinary course, section 9 of the Uniform
Act would protect the latter even though the contract was recorded. There
is hopeless conflict on this point in the decisions of other states and it has
not yet been decided in Missouri. The courts which protect such a buyer do so
upon the theory of estoppel or of implied agency in the dealer to resell and
vest the original vendor's title in the new buyer. Cf. note (1927) 47 A. L. R.
85. It would probably be best to cover this point by a statute similar to sec-
tion 9.
13 Coover v. Johnson (1885) 86 Mo. 533.
i4 Collins v. Wilhoit (1892) 108 Mo. 451, 18 S. W. 839.
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ments is to retake possession of the goods to which he still has
title. By the great weight of authority at common law the
seller could do this regardless of how much the vendee had paid
before the default and without any liability to repay such sums. 5
This was the settled law in Missouri prior to 1877,10 although
the unjust gains that a seller may make by such a forfeiture are
all too apparent in those cases where little remains to be paid.
Some courts have seized the bull by the horns and have declared
boldly that they will not enforce such a right, and require the
seller to repay all but a reasonable compensation for the use of
the goods ;17 but even these courts will not adhere to their view
if there is an express provision for forfeiture in the contract, 18
a provision to which a buyer might readily be forced to agree as
he does not normally seriously contemplate his inability to pay.
The Missouri Statute of 1877 is far more solicitous of the rights
of such buyers. It provides:
Whenever such property is so sold or leased, rented, hired
or delivered, it shall be unlawful for the vendor, leasor,
renter, hirer, or deliverer, or his or their agent or servant,
to take possession of the said property without tendering or
refunding to the purchaser, lessee, renter, or hirer thereof
or any party receiving the same, the sum or sums of money
so paid, after deducting therefrom a reasonable compensa-
tion for the use of such property, which shall in no case ex-
ceed twenty-five per cent of the amount so paid, anything
in the contract to the contrary notwithstanding, and wheth-
er such condition be expressed in such contract or not, un-
less such property has been broken or actually damaged,
and then a reasonable compensation for such breakage or
damage shall be allowed. 19
This Statute has been held to apply to all conditional sales and
to be absolutely mandatory if the seller retakes the property
"' Harris v. Moreland Truck Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1922) 279 F. 543, writ of
error dismissed (1922) 260 U. S. 702; Seanor v. McLaughlin (1895) 165
Pa. 150, 30 Atl. 717.
16 Kingsland-Ferguson Mfg. Co. v. Culp (1885) 85 Mo. 548.
17 Heine Piano Co. v. Crepin (1904) 142 Cal. 609, 76 Pac. 493; Bent v.
Jones (1912) 172 I1. App. 62. Other courts have given the vendee a right
of redemption for a certain period after the retaking. Ames Iron Works
v. Rea (1892) 56 Ark. 450, 19 S. W. 1063. The latter scheme is followed by
statutes in numerous states. Uniform Conditional Sales Acts, secs. 17 and
18; Ala. Civ. Code (1923) sees. 7400 and 7401; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c.
255 sees. 11-13; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) see. 437 (if one-third of the price
has been paid).
is Liver v. Mills (1909) 155 Cal. 459, 101 Pac. 299.
29 Mo. Laws 1877 p. 320, now R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3126.
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either by replevin or otherwise.20 In replevin the plaintiff
must plead and prove compliance with the Statute or there must
be judgment for the defendant.21 If the seller does not comply
with the Statute, but nevertheless succeeds in retaking the
goods, the buyer may maintain a separate suit to recover sev-
enty-five per cent of all payments made.22 The Missouri Courts
have construed the Statute with narrow technicality so that it
does not necessitate any tender where the suit is against anyone
other than the original buyer, interpreting the phrase "or any
person receiving the same" to mean any person receiving the
same from the seller and hence as adding very little to the pre-
ceding words, under none of which such a third party to the orig-
inal contract could fall. 23 It has also been restricted so as to
apply only to cases where the payments have been made in
money, as distinguished from notes or services rendered.24 This
20 Gentry v. Templeton (1891) 47 Mo. App. 55.
21Burt v. Mears (1890) 41 Mo. App. 231. However, the judgment
should be in the alternative so that the seller may return the goods or tender
the defendant the proper amount, to be assessed by the jury in the replevin
action. Burt v. Mears, above. This is the general rule in Missouri where
the defendant has only a special property in the goods, while the generAl
property is in the plaintiff. Dilworth v. McKelvy (1860) 30 Mo. 149.
22 McArthur v. St. Louis Piano Co. (1900) 85 Mo. App. 525; Urquhart v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1921) 207 Mo. App. 627, 227 S. W. 881. This as-
sumes that the reasonable compensation for the use of the goods will be
found by the jury to be the full 25% allowed by the Statute, and that there
has been no actual damage for which reasonable compensation is also al-
lowed. The compensation for the use of the goods must include both inter-
est upon the capital involved and the loss of value caused by the obsolescence
of the goods, as no separate allowance is made for these. This right may
be waived at the time of retaking, but cannot be waived in the original con-
tract. Laclede Power Co. v. Assigned Estate of Ennis Stationery Co.
(1899) 79 Mo. App. 302.
23 Barnes v. Rawlins (1894) 74 Mo. App. 531; Toledo Computing Scale v.
Aubuchon (1915) 187 Mo. App. 687, 173 S. W. 85. Ohio is the only State
that has a statute similar to the Missouri one. This act applies to all con-
ditional sales except certain sales of machinery. It makes repayment neces-
sary only if 25% of the purchase price has been paid, and allows a deduction
of 50% as compensation for the use of the goods. As far as the parties to
whom the repayment is to be made, it is identical with the wording of the
Missouri Statute except that the last phrase is "receiving it from the ven-
dor." Yet under this wording, the Ohio Courts have taken the more liberal
view that such a third party is within the spirit of the Statute and is en-
titled to its protection. Page's Ohio Gen. Code (1926) sec. 8570; Albright
v. Meredith (1898) 58 Ohio 194, 50 N. E. 719; National Cash Register Co. v.
Cervone (1907) 76 Ohio 12, 80 N. E. 1033.
24 Columbus Buggy Co. v. Hord (1896) 65 Mo. App. 41. Here the ac-
ceptances had not been negotiated and were overdue; it was admitted that if
the plaintiff sued subsequently on the acceptances, the defendant would
have a set-off equivalent to the value of the goods when they were taken.
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is doubtless correct from the specific reference to the "sum or
sums of money so paid," but is an oversight in drafting which
might lead to harmful results in a few cases. The Statute ap-
plies to all attempts to retake goods in Missouri no matter where
the original contract was made, it being considered an expres-
sion of a profound public policy of the forum and hence con-
trolling the local Courts in their treatment of such contracts. 25
The fact that after the retaking the vendor resells the article,
but is unable to realize the amount still due on it does not entitle
him to maintain an action against the buyer for the deficiency.
The retaking is treated by the Missouri courts as a complete
rescission of the contract as far as this part of it is concerned. 26
Although such a case has not apparently been decided by any
Missouri appellate court, the weight of authority throughout
the country favors the upholding of an express provision in the
original contract authorizing such a resale and suit for the
deficiency. 27 Some courts have reached this result with marked
reluctance, the Supreme Court of Oregon saying, "However, we
may deplore the folly of the defendant in entering into such a
contract, or the unbounded avarice of a plaintiff who would en-
force it to such an extent, we cannot see our way clear to relieve
the defendant from the burden of his deliberately assumed obli-
gation."28  It is obvious that such a provision makes the instru-
ment far more similar to a chattel mortgage with a special grant
of a power to take and sell than to a true conditional sale.
In probably the vast majority of instances the seller retakes
without resorting to any legal process. It is universally recog-
nized that he may do so when he can regain possession without
entering on the buyer's land or using force.29 If the contract
does not grant a right of entry, the seller is certainly liable for
damages for the trespass to the land30 (usually merely nominal)
and one Michigan case goes so far as to declare him liable in
2 5 American Hoist and Derrick Co. v. Trustee and Registrar Corp. of Mo.
(Mo. App. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 437. A similar decision was reached in a
case involving the Ohio Statute. Wurzell v. Delph (1912) 33 Ohio Cir. Ct.
Rep. 219.
26 Laclede Power Co. v. Assigned Estate of Ennis Stationery Co. (1899)
79 Mo. App. 302. This is the general rule in the absence of statutes.
White v. Solomon (1895) 164 Mass. 516, 42 N. E. 104; Cooper v. Payne
(1907) 190 N. Y. 512, 83 N. E. 1124. Some states have compulsory resale
statutes, cf. 47 below.
27 Harkness v. Russell and Co. (1886) 118 U. S. 663; Bedard v. Ransom
(1922) 241 Mass. 74, 134 N. E. 392.
28 International Harvester Co. v. Baur (1917) 82 Ore. 686, 160 Pac. 856.
29 Vorenberg v. American House Hotel Co. (1923) 246 Mass. 108, 140
N. E. 297. Cf. note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 184.
30 Van Wren v. Flynn (1882) 34 La. Ann. 1158.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss2/10
NOTES
replevin or conversion for the chattel itself.31 If the contract
grants a right of entry, some cases treat this as an irrevo-
cable license which will authorize the seller to break into a house
if necessary. 32 This doctrine seems very dangerous in that such
breaking and entering would certainly encourage breaches of
the peace if the buyer happened to be at home.33 This latter
view is suported by the rule in a majority of the states that the
seller cannot use force as against any person in retaking the
goods or he is liable for damages for assault and battery.3 4 It
would seem that the rule should be established that the buyer can
retake without incurring the expense and bother of legal process,
but only where he can do so without the use of force against
either persons or property. A right of entry to retake in this
manner might well be implied from the existence of the mere
right to retake. Of course, the provisions of the Missouri
Statute must be obeyed whether or not replevin is used.
As against the buyer the seller has also an action for the pur-
chase price agreed upon in the contract between them. 35 Al-
though such an action may culminate in the seizure of the goods
themselves under a writ of execution and their sale by the
sheriff, it is well settled in Missouri that this is not a technical
retaking by the seller to which alone the Statute applies. 36 In
such a suit the seller may take advantage of the exception to the
general exemptions statutes created by Section 1171 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1929:37
Personal property shall in all cases be subject to execu-
tion on a judgment against the purchaser for the purchase
price thereof and shall in no case be exempt from such
judgment and execution, except in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, without notice of the existence of such
prior claim for the purchase money.
'1 Dominick v. Rea (1924) 226 Mich. 594, 198 N. W. 184.
32 Lambert v. Robinson (1894) 162 Mass. 34, 37 N. E. 753; Walsh v. Tay-
lor (1874) 39 Md. 592; Walker Furniture Co. v. Dyson (1908) 32 App.
D. C. 90.
33 Stewart v. North Co. (1916) 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 195.
Biggs v. Seufferlein (1914) 154 Iowa 241, 145 N. W. 547; Singer Sew-
ing Machine Co. v. Phipps (1911) 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 794. Some
courts allow the seller to use reasonable force to overcome force. Lambert
v. Robinson and Walker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, above.
35 Vette v. J. S. Merrel Drug Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 229, 117 S. W. 666;
Conn. v. Orr (1910) 150 Mo. App. 705, 131 S. W. 765. It is also allowed by
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 3.
36 De Loach Mill Mfg. Co. v. Latham (1903) 99 Mo. App. 231, 72 S. W.
1080; American Law Book Co. v. Brewer (1919) 202 Mo. App. 15, 213
S. W. 881.
37 Straus v. Sole Leather Pad Co. (1890) 102 Mo. 261, 14 S. W. 940.
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Since this is solely a contractual right, it is obviously not
available against third parties unless such a third party has as-
sumed, in his contract with the original buyer, the latter's lia-
bility towards the seller.38 If such an assumption were made,
the seller could certainly avail himself of it in Missouri by the
same reasoning which allows a mortgagee to have recourse to
such an assumption as between the mortgagor and a third
party.3 9 Of course, any person holding under the original ven-
dee is under a practical obligation to be sure that the purchase
price is paid, for otherwise he might lose the goods through the
seller's exercise of his right of recaption. The seller would
probably use this form of remedy only where the goods have de-
clined so greatly in value since the original sale that after mak-
ing the repayment to the buyer the vendor would not be able to
obtain enough for them to protect himself from loss on the trans-
action. This result is readily possible in very many instances
for the Statute does not allow any deduction for obsolescence, 40
perhaps the most important factor in the sharp decline in value
for resale of many types of goods, such as automobiles, radios,
and the like.
Another possible remedy is a suit for conversion of the goods.
Since this is based upon title, it is available against either the
buyer or a third party.4 1 Because the measure of damages is
only the amount still unpaid to the seller, 42 there is no practical
advantage in using it rather than a suit on the contract.for the
unpaid balance when brought against the original buyer. In-
deed, its use would have a disadvantage in that the execution to
recover any judgment obtained would be subject to the general
exemption statutes, without the benefit of the exception as to
goods purchased in an action for the purchase price. As against
a person claiming under the vendee it affords normally the only
way to obtain a money judgment, since such a person is not liable
on the contract. Of course the judgment is limited to the value
of the goods at the time of the alleged conversion, 43 but this may
easily be more than the seller could realize by retaking them and
selling them, as such a resale would surely involve some expense
to the latter. It has frequently been said that there must be a
demand and a refusal to deliver before such an action can be
3 8 Breakstne v. Buffalo Foundry Co. (1915) 167 App. Div. 62, 152
N. Y. S. 394; Wright Motor Co. v. Shaw (1926) 171 Ark. 935, 287 S. W. 177.
39 Fitzgerald v. Barker (1879) 70 Mo. 685.
40 Cf. n. 22 above.
41 Eisenberg v. Nelson (Mo. App. 1922) 247 S. W. 242. Cf. note (1931)
73 A. L. R. 799.4 2 Eisenberg v. Nelson, above.
43 Davis v. Bliss (1907) 187 N. Y. 77, 79 N. E. 851.
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maintained. 44 This general rule is unquestionably too broad.
There must always be some evidence of a conversion, and such a
refusal is sometimes the only possible evidence, but its place may
be taken by any other act which positively asserts ownership in
the goods, such as a sale of them. 45
Recent Missouri cases have tended to establish a fourth pos-
sible remedy, a suit to foreclose an equitable lien on the goods.
Such a suit proceeds on the theory that the buyer has title to the
goods subject to a lien to the seller for the unpaid installments.46
This is directly contrary to the theory on which the seller's
rights to retake and sue for conversion are based. At first
glance it seems anomalous to think of title to goods shifting at
the mere whim of one party, regardless of the stipulations of the
contract.
The view that foreclosure of an equitable lien was a proper
remedy for a conditional vendor was imported into Missouri
jurisprudence from other states. In many of these it was a
logical deduction from special statutes which required the seller
after retaking to resell and turn over to the buyer any surplus
after paying the costs of the sale and the balance due on the
contract. 47 In some of these states the buyer was liable for any
deficiency. 48 Under such statutes there could be but little ob-
jection to the fairness of the dealing being supervised by a court
of equity. The Virginia Statute specifically provides for such
foreclosure. 49 However there are at least four jurisdictions
that have allowed such proceedings in the absence of special
44 Sanders v. Keber and Muller (1876) 28 Ohio 630. Cf. note (1931) 73
A. L. R. 799.
45 Eisenberg v. Nelson, above; Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk and Boston
Street Ry. Co. (1907) 187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E. 646.
"Wayne Tank and Pump Co. v. Quick Service Laundry Co. (Mo. App.
1926) 285 S. W. 705, rehearing on another point (Mo. App. 1930) 29 S. W.
(2d) 161.
4, The Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides for a mandatory public
sale if the buyer has paid more than 50% (sec. 19), and allows either party
to demand one if less has been paid (sec. 20). The surplus realized over
the costs of the sale and the balance due on the contract goes to the buyer,
while if there is a deficiency, the buyer is still liable to a suit on the con-
tract for this (sec. 22). Massachusetts makes" such a resale compulsory if
the buyer has paid 75%. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 255 sec. 11. North
Carolina and Tennessee statutes do so in all instances. N. C. Code (1927)
sec. 2587; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1917), secs. 3670a7-3670a11.
48 In North Carolina, Tennessee and states which have adopted the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act.
' Va. Code Ann. (1924) sec. 5190. Texas and Utah have provided by
statute that all contracts reserving title shall be treated as chattel mort-
gages. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1920) sec. 5654; Utah Laws (1917) sec. 478.
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statutes of any kind. 0 These courts were largely actuated by
the belief that such a proceeding was better for the vendee than
if the vendor had chosen to exercise his harsh common law
rights to retake the article, forfeiting any payments already
made.51 Once the courts admitted the possibility of a fore-
closure suit, it was but a step to allow a deficiency judgment for
this was a normal concomitant of suits to foreclose liens.52
Although there were scattered dicta In some early Missouri
cases which called the seller's right over the goods a lien, 53 the
first case to permit a suit in equity to foreclose such a lien was
decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1913. This case
was one between the vendor and a mortgagee of the buyer and
the right to sue in equity was put upon the ground that this was
better for the defendant than if the seller had merely retaken the
goods (the Statute as to repayment of course does not apply as
the defendant is not a party to the original contract).54 Two
years later the Springfield Court of Appeals refused to decide in
a suit to foreclose a lien whether the instrument in question was
a conditional sales contract or a chattel mortgage, holding it
made no difference which it was as the defendant, a third party,
had no right to the goods as against the plaintiff in either case.6
In the case of Wayne Tank and Pump Co. v. Quick Service
Laundry Co.,56 the Kansas City Court of Appeals again allowed a
suit to foreclose a lien, expressly holding such a proceeding jus-
tified both at Common Law and under the Missouri Statute, al-
though pointing out that on the facts of the particular case the
Missouri Statute would not apply. The same Court, in the
next year, allowed such a suit between the original parties,
incidentally remarking that the adequacy of the remedy
at law would not bar equity,51 a most unusual statement
in a modern case, for theoretically the basis for equitable
50 Gigray v. Mumper (1909) 141 Iowa 396, 118 N. W. 393; McDaniel v.
Chiaramonte (1912) 61 Ore. 403, 122 Pac. 33; Southern Ice Co. v. Alley
(1912) 127 Tenn. 173, 154 S. W. 536 (prior to the Tennessee statute men-
tioned above); Ballinger v. West Publishing Co. (1915) 44 App. D. C. 49,
certiorari denied (1915) 239 U. S. 649.
51 McDaniel v. Chiaramonte, above.
52 Ballinger v. West Publishing Co. above; Southern Ice Co. v. Alley,
above; Sheridan First National Bank v. Ylkum (1920) 96 Ore. 438, 189
Pac. 220.
53 Kingsland v. Drum (1883) 80 Mo. 646; Farmer v. Moore (1898) 73
Mo. App. 527.
54 Wolf. Co. v. Hermann Savings Bank (1913) 168 Mo. App: 549, 153
S. W. 1094.
55 Musselman v. City of Joplin (Mo. App. 1915) 180 S. W. 1058.
56 (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S. W. 750.
57 Kolb v. Golden Rule Baking Co., above.
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action is the inadequacy of the remedy at law. In the most re-
cent case the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the right to
foreclose a lien was "well settled" in Missouri practice, although
the case was reversed upon another point.58 In the earlier cases
there had been no prayer for deficiency judgment, but in this
case such a judgment was asked, if necessary. This point was
passed over in silence by the Court. Obviously where the de-
fendant is not bound in contract to pay the balance due such a
prayer would be improper, but where he is bound to pay, such a
prayer seems justified under the general practice in the fore-
closure of liens, if the lien theory is to be adopted at all. Similar
results have been reached by the Federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal and the Ohio Supreme Court in construing the Ohio
Statute.59
It may well be asked why an honest defendant should care
whether the seller chooses to sue to foreclose a lien or to sue for
the balance due and levy on the particular goods, or if it is not
possible to pray for a deficiency judgment because a third party
is being sued, whether the seller takes the goods by way of a
foreclosure sale or by a writ of replevin before there has been
any trial at all. It must be confessed that if the defendant is a
third party any objection to foreclosure would be purely tech-
nical, for the third party is really benefited by the seller's choice
as he is enabled to use the goods longer. The former case pre-
sents more difficulties. If the seller retook the goods directly, he
would have to pay back at least 75% of the payments made and
could not recover any deficiency between their resale price (plus
the compensation deducted for the use of the goods while the
buyer had them) and the original contract price. Of course, if
the seller sued on the contract, he could always levy on the goods
and have them sold, but this is likely to be a far slower process
than the suit to foreclose a lien, for the jury trial dockets seem
always to be more crowded than the equity dockets. It can be
urged with justice that the buyer has no vested right in the Law's
delay, and that this is an argument of practicality rather than of
justice. Nevertheless, it remains true that the buyer may be
only temporarily embarrassed, or may be able to obtain the
money to pay for the goods by the use of them during this period
of delay. Perhaps a far more potent argument against allow-
ing suit in a court of equity is the power of such a court to ap-
point a receiver ancillary to a proceeding before it. If a re-
ceiver is appointed, the buyer may lose the goods just as soon as
11 General Excavator Co. v. Emory (Mo. App. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 490.
59 Parker Appliance Co. v. Co-operative Machinery Co. (1924) 111 Ohio
255, 142 N. E. 891; Re National Cash Register Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1909) 179 F.
579; Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dial (C. C. A. 6, 1918) 257 F. 574.
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he would if the seller had retaken them, and yet the buyer re-
ceives no return of his payments. The traditional requirement
for appointing a receiver has been well laid down by Professor
Pomeroy: "The plaintiff must show, first that he has a clear
right to the property itself or that he has some lien on it
and secondly that the possession of the property by the defend-
ant was obtained by fraud or that the property itself or the in-
come from it is in danger of loss from the neglect, waste, mis-
conduct, or insolvency of the defendant. The element of danger
is an important consideration i a remote or past danger will not
suffice as a grounds for the relief, but there must be a well
grounded apprehension of immediate injury. Nor will the
court act upon a possible danger only; the danger must be great
and imminent, demanding immediate relief."60  Unfortunately
the judges of the Missouri circuit courts61 seem at times to for-
get these sound principles and the even sounder caution which
Pomeroy adds, "The appointment of a receiver is one of the most
responsible duties which a court of equity is called upon to per-
form; and while resting within the sound judicial discretion of
the court, the power is, or should be, exercised with great cau-
tion and circumspection."62
In some instances it may be contended that although the seller
originally had all the rights outlined above, he cannot now
prosecute the one he desires because of his past actions. Mis-
souri agrees with the majority rule that the mere taking of
notes for installments at the time of making the contract does
not bar a subsequent retaking under a condition reserving title
until payment is made in cash.63 Some states hold that the
various rights of the seller are not inconsistent and that he can
pursue them all (with the possible exception of claiming a
lien) 04 until he secures a satisfied judgment, 3 but Missouri and
601 Pomeroy, EQUITABLEL R. mmrEs (1905) sec. 64.61 Cf. General Excavator Co. v. Emory, above.
621 Pomeroy op. cit. sec. 67. "By the settled practice of the court, in or-
dinary suits, a receiver cannot be appointed ex parte, before the defendant
has had an opportunity to be heard in relation to his rights except in those
cases where he is out of the jurisdiction of the court, or where, for some
other reason, it becomes absolutely necessary for the court to interfere, be-
fore there is time to give notice to the opposite party, to prevent the de-
struction or loss of the property." Verplanck v. Mercantile Insurance Co.
of N. Y. (N. Y. 1831) 2 Paige 438.
68 Columbus Buggy Co. v. Hord, above; Kingsland-Verguson Mfg. Co. v.
Culp (1885) 85 Mo. 548; Segrist v. Crabtree (1889) 131 U. S. 287.
64Kirk v. Crystal (1908) 193 N. Y. 622, 86 N. E. 1124; contra, Bierce v.
Hutehins (1907) 205 U. S. 340.6 White v. Solomon and Bierce v. Hutchins above. Cf. notes (1921) 12
A. L. R. 503 and (1928) 56 A. L. R. 238.
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many other states maintain that the remedies are based on rad-
ically inconsistent theories of law and of the relation of the
facts and that hence the seller must elect which right he will
exercise.66 Unfortunately there is hopeless conflict as to what
is a binding election. 67 Missouri seems to have adopted the more
liberal, and probably better, rule that the mere bringing of an
action on which the seller was forced to take a nonsuit is not an
election. 68 It is possible that even where there is not a binding
election the seller may be estopped from asserting some of his
rights.
Although the present Missouri law on the remedies of the
conditional vendor seems to be largely satisfactory, certain stat-
utory changes would be wise. The Statute as to retaking should
be amended so as to apply to retakings from a person claiming
under the vendee as well as from the vendee and so as to allow a
reasonable deduction for obsolescence of the goods as well as for
their actual depreciation. The seller should probably be allowed
to continue to sue in equity to foreclose a lien, but the greatest
care should be used in the appointment of receivers, and they
should not be appointed merely because the property is subject
to greater depreciation and obsolescence while being used than
if it were stored. If this were done, the Missouri law would be
far superior to the more cumbersome system set up by the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act with its periods of redemption and
forced resales.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION BY PARTY CONTROL
OVER PRIMARY ELECTIONS-Nixon v. Condon
The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State,
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
66 Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior Springs Bottling Co.
(Mo. App. 1914) 171 S. W. 940. Good case comment in (1915) 7 Mo. L.
BuLl. 44.
67 Cf. A. L. R. notes cited in n. 65.
68 Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior Springs Bottling Co.,
above. Sec. 24 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides: "Neither
the bringing of an action by the seller for the recovery of the whole or any
part of the purchase price, nor the recovery of a judgment in such action,
nor the collection of a portion of the price shall be deemed inconsistent with
a later retaking of the goods . . . But such right of retaking shall not be
exercised after he has collected the entire price, or after he has claimed a
lien on the good, or attached them, or levied upon them as the goods of the
buyer."
Washington University Open Scholarship
